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ABSTRACT
We introduce the concept of an elastic block cipher, which
refers to stretching the supported block size of a block ci-
pher to any length up to twice the original block size while
incurring a computational workload that is proportional to
the block size. We define a method for converting any ex-
isting block cipher into an elastic block cipher and mention
our analysis of the construction.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.0 [General]: Data Encryption
General Terms
block ciphers, algorithms, encryption
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1. INTRODUCTION
Standard block ciphers are designed around one or a small
number of block sizes, with most supporting 128-bit blocks.
In applications, the length of the data to be encrypted is
often not a multiple of the supported block size. This re-
sults in the use of plaintext-padding schemes that impose
computational and space overheads by appending bits to the
data. When the data being encrypted is relatively small, the
padding can become a significant portion of the encrypted
data. For example, encrypting a database at the field or row
level to allow for efficient querying can easily result in a sub-
stantial amount of padding. When the plaintext is between
one and two blocks, an elastic block cipher allows all of the
bits to be encrypted as a single block, avoiding the need
to use a mode of encryption and creating a stronger bind-
ing across the ciphertext bits compared to the ciphertext
produced by a mode of encryption, such as CBC.
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We introduce the concept of an elastic block cipher, which
allows us to ”stretch” the supported block size of a block
cipher up to a length double the original block size, while
increasing the computational workload proportionally to the
block size. This, together with modes of operation, permits
block sizes to be set based on an application’s requirements,
allowing, for example, a non-traditional block size to be used
for all blocks, or a traditional block size to be used for all
but the last block in a given mode of operation. We pro-
pose a general method for creating an elastic block cipher
from an existing block cipher. Our intent is not to design a
new ad-hoc cipher, but to systematically build upon existing
block ciphers. Our method consists of a network structure
that uses the round function from an existing block cipher,
allowing us to treat the round function of the original ci-
pher as a black box and reuse its properties. This results in
the security of the elastic version of a cipher being directly
related to that of the original cipher.
Previous proposals for converting existing block ciphers
into variable-length ones focused on treating a block cipher
as a black box and combining it with other operations [2, 8].
While such an approach allows the security of the variable-
length block cipher to be defined in terms of original block
cipher, the resulting constructions require multiple appli-
cations of the original block cipher, making them compu-
tationally inefficient compared to padding. These methods
may be valuable in providing modes of encryption that pre-
serve the length of the data but they do not address how
to design block ciphers to support variable-length blocks.
There have also been ad-hoc attempts to design a variable-
length block cipher from scratch [9, 11]. Ciphertext stealing
is a way of preserving the length of the data when using a
mode of encryption (as opposed to having the block cipher
support a range of block sizes). It involves padding the par-
tial plaintext block using ciphertext from the previous block
and treats the partial block as a full block instead of adjust-
ing the computational work to the actual number of bits.
Furthermore, the partial block must be decrypted before its
preceding block.
2. METHOD
2.1 Notation and Definitions
We use the following notation and definitions when de-
scribing the construction of elastic block ciphers.
• G denotes any existing block cipher with a fixed-length
block size that is structured as a sequence of rounds.
By default, any block cipher that is not structured as a
sequence of rounds is viewed as having a single round.
• A cycle in G is the sequence of steps in which all b
bits have been processed by the round function. For
example, in AES [7], the round function is a cycle. In
a balanced Feistel network, a sequence of two applica-
tions of the round function, which processes b
2
bits in
each application, is a cycle. In RC6 [10], the sequence
of four applications of the round function is a cycle.
• r denotes the number of cycles in G.
• b denotes the block length of the input to G in bits.
• y is an integer in the range [0, b].
• G′ denotes the modified G with a (b + y)-bit input for
any valid value of y. G′ will be referred to as the elastic
version of G.
• r′ denotes the number of rounds in G′.
• A bit (position) input to a block cipher is called active
in a round if the bit is input to the round function.
• The round function of G′ is one cycle of G.
2.2 Construction
Our algorithm converts the encryption and decryption
functions of existing block ciphers to accept blocks of size
b to 2b bits, where b is the block size of the original block
cipher. Our method uses a network structure, the elastic
network shown in Figure 1, into which the cycle of the orig-
inal block cipher is inserted. This allows the properties of
the original block cipher’s round function to be reused. The
elastic network creates a permutation on b + y bits from a
round function that processes b bits, where 0 ≤ y ≤ b.
Figure 1: Elastic Network
The properties we require of the network structure are:
• It provides a permutation on b + y bits for any 0 ≤
y ≤ b where b is the block size of the fixed-length
block cipher.
• It is a single, generic, construction that can be used
with any block cipher.
• The cycle of any existing b-bit block cipher becomes a
component of the structure without any modification
to it.
• The number of rounds is not set by the structure,
but rather the round function can be applied as many
times as needed by a specific cipher.
• The rate of diffusion for b+y bits is defined in terms of
the rate of diffusion for b bits in the fixed-length block
cipher.
• The operations involved in the structure allow for ef-
ficient implementations in terms of time and memory
requirements.
Our process of converting a fixed-length block cipher into
an elastic block cipher involves inserting the cycle of the
fixed-length block cipher into the elastic network, adding
initial and final key-dependent permutations, adding or ex-
panding initial and end-of-round whitening, and determin-
ing the number of rounds required. The general structure
of the method is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Elastic Block Cipher Structure
The following steps convert G with a fixed, b-bit, block
size into its elastic version, G′, that can process b + y bits,
for 0 ≤ y ≤ b.
1. Set the number of rounds, r′, such that each of the
b+ y bits is input to and active in the same number of
cycles in G′ as each of the b bits is in G. r′ = r+ ⌈ ry
b
⌉.
2. Apply initial and end-of-round whitening (XORing with
expanded-key bits) to all b+y bits. If G includes these
whitening steps, the steps are modified to include all
b + y bits. If G does not have these whitening step,
the steps are added when creating G′.
3. Prior to the first round and after the last round, apply
a key-dependent mixing step that permutes or mixes
the bits in a manner that any individual bit is not
guaranteed to be in the rightmost y bits with a prob-
ability of 1. The leftmost b bits that are output from
the initial mixing step are the input to the first round
function. The initial mixing step is between the initial
whitening and first round function. The final mixing
step is after the last round function and prior to the
final whitening.
4. Alternate which y bits are left out of the round func-
tion by XORing the y bits left out of the previous
round function with y bits from the round function’s
output, then swap the result with the y bits left out of
the previous round. This step is performed after the
end of round whitening. Specifically:
(a) Let Y denote the y bits that were left out of the
round function.
(b) Let X denote some subset of y bits from the round
function’s output of b bits. A different set of
X bits (in terms of position) is selected in each
round.
(c) Set Y ← X ⊕ Y .
(d) Swap X and Y to form the input to the next
round.
This ”swap step” may be added to the last round if it
is required that all rounds be identical. However, hav-
ing it after the last round does not provide additional
security.
The result, G′, is a permutation on b + y bits. Its inverse,
the decryption function, consists of the network applied in
reverse and the round function replaced by its inverse.
The method is designed for G′ to be equivalent to G, with
the possible addition of whitening and the key-dependent
mixing steps, when the data is an integral number of b-bit
blocks, while accommodating a range of b to 2b-bit blocks.
We note that if complete diffusion (every bit impacting all
other bits) occurs after q cycles in G then it occurs after at
most q + 1 rounds in G′.
The elastic version of a block cipher requires a greater
number of expanded-key bits than the fixed-length version.
In our implementations, we used a stream cipher as the key
schedule in order to significantly increase the randomness of
the expanded key bits over those produced by existing key
schedules, to allow as many expanded-key bits as needed
to be produced without having to alter the key schedule for
each block cipher, and to illustrate the concept of a standard
key schedule that is independent of the specific block cipher.
Using a stream cipher does incur a performance penalty
over existing key schedules, but increasing the randomness
of expanded-key bits aids in the prevention of attacks by
reducing attacks due to the key schedule and decreasing the
possibility that an attacker can obtain additional expanded-
key bits after recovering only a few expanded-key bits.
3. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We briefly mention here the main results in our analysis
of elastic block ciphers. Detailed results are available in [3]
and will be the subjects of future publications. The analysis
justifies our choice of structure and steps for creating elastic
block ciphers. In order to verify the security of our design
we analyzed both the general approach and instantiations
of elastic block ciphers.
First we employed a ”reduction method” that exploits
the elastic network structure and the fact that we used the
round function of the original cipher as a black box. We
are able to relate the security of elastic block ciphers in gen-
eral against practical attacks to the security of the original
ciphers against such attacks. We proved that the elastic
version of a block cipher is secure against any attack that
attempts to recover the key or expanded-key bits if the orig-
inal cipher is secure against the attack. This result elimi-
nates the need to analyze each elastic block cipher individu-
ally against practical attacks (such as linear and differential
cryptanalysis) if the fixed-length versions are secure against
such attacks.
Second, we considered specific attacks to provide a more
concrete analysis. We proved that any algebraic equations
relating the expanded-key, plaintext and ciphertext bits of
the elastic version can be converted to equations for the
fixed-length version in polynomial time and memory We
show how the probability that a differential characteristic
holds in the elastic version of a block cipher can be calcu-
lated using the probability a differential holds through one
cycle of the original cipher, and applied the technique to
elastic versions of AES and MISTY1 [5].
Third, by viewing the network in an ideal form (similar to
the analysis performed by Luby and Rackoff on Feistel net-
works [4]) where the round functions are independently cho-
sen pseudorandom permutations (PRP) on b bits, we prove
that a three round elastic network is a PRP and a five round
elastic network is a strong PRP on b + y bits, 0 ≤ y ≤ b.
Fourth, in order to demonstrate our method, we created
four examples of elastic block ciphers from AES, Camellia
[1], MISTY1 and RC6. For each example, we compared
the performance of the elastic version to that of the origi-
nal cipher with padding. We tested the randomness of the
ciphertext in the four elastic examples using the statistical
tests used by NIST in the AES competition [6]. The results
indicate sufficient randomness in the ciphertext and no obvi-
ous design flaw in the elastic block ciphers. The support for
variable-sized blocks also allows for new modes of encryption
to be defined.
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